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The phonograph, in one sense, knows more than we do ourselves. For it will retain a 
perfect mechanical memory of many things which we may forget, even though we 
have said them.
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What should we make of Thomas Edison’s claim that “the phonograph [...] knows 
more”? Edison is hesitant, carefully delimiting his assertion to “one sense,” and cautiously 
non-committal, applying to an unarticulated consensus about what we ourselves know and so 
preserving the primacy of human knowledge. And yet his claim is bold: the phonograph will 
surpass humanity in its characteristic activity of knowing. The reality and tragedy of this is 
felt in the belated second clause of the second sentence – “even though we have said them.” 
The perfected “mechanical memory” overrules any authorial right to knowledge, intruding 
upon this most intimate relation of human identity, the self-reflexive knowing that constitutes 
the sense of self. This is what is at stake when Edison claims the “phonograph [...] knows 
more.” But he is careful to hedge his assertion round with qualifications to prevent this 
conclusion. It is hard to talk about what it means to “know” – we can only talk about it in 
“one sense” or the other – and it is particularly hard when knowledge is distanced from the 
human mind, retained within a “mechanical memory.”  
It is this difficult distancing of knowledge from human consciousness and its 
inscription as material text that is the distinctive form nineteenth-century phonographic 
experiments give to epistemological questions. From Alexander Melville Bell’s Visible 
Speech which graphically depicted sound in the human mouth, to Isaac Pitman’s 
phonographic shorthand in which the “very sound of every word is made VISIBLE,”2 to 
Edison’s wax cylinders traced with the voices of Tennyson and Browning, these attempts to 
inscribe sound – to make voice occur outside of the body – were shadowed by questions 
about knowing occurring outside the mind. For as fugitive, temporal, embodied utterances 
were given permanent, reproducible, graphic form as phonographic writing or recordings, so 
knowledge, expressed and witnessed to by words, seemed to become unmoored from human 
consciousness.  
Phonographic inscription not only dislocates voice from the speaking body, it also 
transforms it. Words become grammalogues or needle-etchings, sound becomes visual 
notation. And this new material existence requires a new way of listening – a listening that 
begins with reading a text, interpreting grammalogues or running a needle across the 
cylinder. The transformation that accompanies dislocation similarly reformulates ideas about 
what knowledge is and how it might be known. Edison’s claim is that the phonograph 
“knows” – it does not merely possess “knowledge” but actively “knows,” cognition fully 
transposed from the human mind to the phonograph’s “mechanical memory.” But what does 
it mean for the phonograph “to know”? Can it still mean awareness of sensory impression, or 
perception of truth, or recognition of pattern, or acquaintance with a thing, or insight into 
 
 
oneself, or self-reflexive consciousness? Given the transformation that occurs in 
phonographic inscription, even the basic elements of human knowledge – consciousness, 
temporal sequencing, self-reflexivity, and so on – are open to transformation as phonographic 
technologies replicate and surpass our patterns of knowing. 
Hardy’s well-known poem, “The Voice” (1912), reverberates with the sound of these 
questions: 
Woman much missed, how you call to me, call to me 
Saying that now you are not as you were 
When you had changed from the one who was all to me, 
But as at first, when our day was fair.
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The disembodied voice (“Woman much missed”), the call that summons presence (“how you 
call to me, call to me/ Saying”), the alteration of form when it becomes memory (“that now 
you are not as you were”) when it becomes inscribed as text – these questions can be heard 
here, echoing on the edges of the poem’s soundscape. But when I say that this poem 
reverberates with these questions, I mean precisely that; the form registers their presence and 
re-expresses it as internalised pattern, as vibration, instead of re-sounding them as verbal 
content. Phonography, after all, transforms sound into text as it is remembered. For Hardy, 
these questions about forms of knowledge and knowing reverberate in the repeated 
syntactical phrase. 
 
 The opening line illustrates Hardy’s characteristic use of the repeated syntactical 
phrase. It is a moment of syntactical and referential coincidence. The woman’s call is only 
posited, its tonality, content, and extension unheard. But as syntax progresses through time it 
generates a textual pattern that is conterminous with the unheard projection of sound. The 
rhyme and repetition of “call to me, call to me” becomes a form of textual continuity, 
movements of sound temporally extended as they are heard to repeat. And so the woman’s 
unheard ‘call’ finds textual presence in the ordered recurrence of “call.” The inaudible voice 
is demarcated by the text, the connection established when “call” refers to the absent sound 
and begins to recur as syntactical pattern. After this moment of coincidence syntactical 
pattern and voice recur independently of each other but continue to bear the impress of the 
initial association. The newly involuted phrasing of the second and third lines distinguishes 
them from the repetitions of the first, suggesting a shift of attention from the sound of the 
woman’s “call” to a gloss of its content. The syntactical phrase, however, is repeated in the 
third line as “who was all to me,” recalling its original association with the woman’s voice, 
the echo sounded more loudly by its prominent rhyme with “call to me.” As the syntactical 
pattern continues, it reproduces its initial association with voice, giving it an ongoing formal 
presence despite a changed semantic context. The woman’s voice is no longer the subject of 
attention and description but rather of explication and translation. The repeated syntactical 
phrase which gives voice (and, its ghostly companion, presence) textual form, is the 
characteristic feature of Hardy’s best poetry. This syntax, in its recursions and evocations and 
 
 
re-soundings, shares many formal features with nineteenth-century phonographic 
technologies, and focuses attention on forms of disembodied knowing. 
 
 A brief note on syntax. By “syntax” here I mean poetic syntax. Poetic syntax quite 
properly begins with the construction of sentences according to the principles of grammatical 
well-formedness – it begins as syntax. But in poetry it is not only syntax that governs word-
order: versification – rhyme, rhythm, metre, lineation, echo, repetition, and so on – also 
circumscribes the ordering of words. And then prosody moves in and across this dyadic 
organisation. Timbre, stress, accent, tonality, pitch, duration – the qualities peculiar to a lyric 
text, a text with some thought for its vocal possibilities – negotiate a particular spoken form 
of the poem that has sound and extension. But prosody is not just a third organisational mode, 
adding its own demands to the sometimes competing, sometimes divergent orders of syntax 
and versification. Prosody also mediates towards particularity, the possibilities of syntax and 
versification constrained to possible vocal configurations. But when we read silently, these 
configurations remain undecided, suggestive of particularity but remaining legion. Eric 
Griffiths elegantly describes this strange quality of silent prosody:  
 
The intonational ambiguity of the written text may create a mute polyphony through 
which we see rather than hear alternatively possible voicings, and are led by such 
vision to reflect on the inter-resonance of those voicings.
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Poetic syntax consists in this coexistence of syntax and versification and prosody – and the 
animation of all by the latter. It is formed in these coincidences and dissonances, relations 
and irrelevancies, and in their ongoing rubbings alongside each other.  Thus, “call to me” is a 
syntactical pattern but versification (rhyme, dactylic shape, stanzaic position) strengthens its 
repetitions and echoes while prosody foregrounds the interplay between text and (un)heard 
voice. The repeated syntactical phrase is therefore a part of verse in which syntax, 
versification, and prosody co-operate to give the phrase a distinctive form and unity, a formal 
identity which persists through its repetition. Nevertheless, despite the inflections of 
versification and prosody, the more basic form of syntax as sentence-ordering, uninflected by 
readerly attention, retains its priority in Hardy’s poetic syntax. This is because the syntactical 
phrase determines what gets repeated and prosodic elements find continuation, repetition, or 
variation within it. 
  
Returning, then, to the consonance between Hardy’s syntactical repetitions and 
phonographic technologies. Some innovative interdisciplinary work has investigated the 
effect of phonographic developments on the Victorian imagination. Friedrich Kittler’s 
landmark Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (1999) traces the phonograph’s influence on the 
late nineteenth-century fascination with haunting and the supernatural. He suggests that the 
development of phonographic technologies was enabled by the “immaterials” of scientific 
thought – namely, the gradual scientific-materialist dismantling of the human soul until it 
became merely “the nervous system, and the nervous system [...] so many facilitations”  (p. 
29). Within this framework the “soul” takes on inverted commas, a scientific untruth. But, 
expelled from the body, the disembodied ‘soul’ becomes a sign for the material body. It is 
 
 
this metaphorization of “soul,” Kittler argues, that enabled the late Victorian imagination to 
conceive of the disembodied voice as a real presence, as a representation of the entirety of 
being, and so opening the door to ghostly voices and spectral presences. In turn, these ghosts 
gave cultural form to the scientific “immaterials.”  
 
For Kittler, the growth of phonographic sciences paradoxically prompted a resurgence 
of interest in the occult and supernatural. An alternative narrative of demystification is 
charted by John Picker’s Victorian Soundscapes (2003): sound is transformed from a 
“sublime experience into a quantifiable and marketable object or thing, a sonic commodity” 
(p. 10). Although Kittler and Picker consider the interaction between phonography and 
poetry, their discussion remains limited to the inflexion given to verse by an awareness of 
these alien technologies. They do not consider how poetry may re-imagine the phonographic 
endeavour in idiosyncratically poetic terms. Tim Armstrong attempted to apply some of these 
observations about the effect of phonography on the Victorian imagination more directly to 
Hardy’s poetry in Haunted Hardy: Poetry, History, Memory (2000). His attempt, however, 
remains focussed on the imaginative forms given to scientific “immaterials,” considering the 
haunting (and hauntologies) of Hardy’s verse primarily as a thematic – rather than poetic – 
phenomenon. 
 
Just as these studies of the cultural forms of phonography do not extend their 
observations of mechanical technologies to the poetic re-formulations of the recorded, 
disembodied voice, so critical studies of Hardy’s verse-technique perceptively comment on 
the construction of his texts without acknowledging that these insights are ultimately about 
the nature of Hardy’s poetic syntax. The best critics move towards observing the strange 
recurrence of his syntactical phrasing as it circles against his more linear narratives. Here is 
Dennis Taylor on Hardy’s “metrical rhythms”: “The patterns language assumes are 
momentary, they grow out of one time configuration of mind and reality, they grow old, they 
bind us for a while in their obsolescing frames.”5 With characteristically well-weighed words, 
Taylor captures the tone and movement of the repeated syntactic phrase: it moves through 
time, recalling an original but lost “configuration” of subject and form, of voice and syntax. 
Yet despite the straining of his language towards connoting a poetic phenomenon – the 
conjunction of syntax and prosody in the “patterns” of “language” – this discussion is firmly 
and repeatedly delimited to the prosodic, “the basic nature of English accentual-syllabic 
form.” Similarly, Eric Griffiths observes the double-nature of Hardy’s poems in which 
articulated thought is shadowed by alternative structures of knowledge: “the printed voice of 
his poetry allows for the kind of contemplated wistfulness with regard to the implausibility of 
what he still desires [...] and which defeats his powers of expression [...].”6 Nevertheless, this 
observation remains confined to the local equivocations over pronunciation which leave 
unvoiced alternatives or meanings wrong-footed by unexpected stress-patterns.  
 
While Taylor and Griffiths comment incisively on the particularities of Hardy’s verse, 
neither discern that the instances of divergence they observe between form and thought are 
part of the broader phenomenon of a poetic syntax that offers an alternative way of knowing 
– a way of knowing which derives from, diverges with, and returns to inflect articulated 
 
 
knowledge. Donald Davie remains the most astute observer of Hardy’s verse. Following 
Articulate Energy (1955), Davie’s studies in Hardy are a practical extension of this inquiry 
into the syntax of English poetry. Attending to syntax as a locus of meaning is particularly 
productive with Hardy because, as I noted earlier, the repeated syntactical phrase is a 
favourite mode and a characteristic feature of his best verse. Davies observes that Hardy’s 
poetry, in its insistent foregrounding of alternative, syntactical structures of knowing, can 
make difficult reading: 
 
For readers, it seems, will always take more readily to the subjective making demands 
on the objective, than to any traffic the other way. And for this reason most readers, 
even in England, will always find Hardy’s poetry, however estimable and touching, 
insufficiently exciting.
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These “objective demands” are the demands of a poetry that is expressive on its own terms, 
insisting on attention to its own structural patterns, rather than conforming to readerly habits 
of knowing. Davie’s observation reflects the uncertain critical reception of Hardy’s verse, 
veering between moments of praise for its technical accomplishment and decades of 
inattention. However, Davie wrongly implies that the “objective demands” are most felt by 
the reader. For Hardy, the possibility that syntax offers an alternative form of knowing is 
most immediately a puzzle and a resource for the poet. 
 
 Returning to “The Voice,” the repeated syntactical phrase – already in complex 
relationship to voice in the first stanza through their initial coincidence and subsequent 
divergence – undergoes further convolutions. 
 
Woman much missed, how you call to me, call to me, 
Saying that now you are not as you were 
When you had changed from the one who was all to me, 
But as at first, when our day was fair. 
 
Can it be you that I hear? Let me view you, then, 
Standing as when I drew near to the town 
Where you would wait for me: yes, as I knew you then, 
Even to the original air-blue gown! 
 
Or is it only the breeze, in its listlessness 
Travelling across the wet mead to me here, 
You being ever dissolved to wan wistlessness, 
Heard no more again far or near? 
 
 Thus I; faltering forward, 
 Leaves around me falling, 
Wind oozing thin through the thorn from norward, 
 And the woman calling. 
 
 
 
The first stanza seems to establish the pattern that “call to me” syntactically represents the 
woman’s voice. But what is represented by syntax? The sound of her voice, or the content of 
her call, or the memory of the sound, or the real presence of the woman, or the hallucination 
of her presence – or does syntax represent none of these, merely telling a story about its own 
re-callings? And how this representation works is also unclear. Is the connection between 
syntax and “voice” technical, or formal, or epistemological, or ontological – or merely the 
result of an initial coincidence, impressing on syntax an arbitrary association with voice?  
 
 After attending to the woman’s call as repeated syntactical phrase in the first stanza, 
Hardy’s attention gains a new analytic acuity in the second. Taking the first stanza’s 
repetitive patterning of the syntactical phrase (twice in the first line, once at the end of the 
third), the second stanza demands that this syntactical repetition prove its ability to represent 
voice. At first, “Can it be you that I hear?” seems a statement of simple disbelief – is that 
really Emma’s voice? But, remembering the questions the first stanza raised, it soon sounds a 
more cunning question – can it be you that I hear? (Or am I only hearing syntax?) And the 
experiment begins – “Can it be you that I hear? Let me view you, then.” The construction in 
which the woman is grammatically present as “you” is repeated in its syntactical ordering and 
with its internal rhymes; if this is indeed a syntactical trace or analogue of her voice, then, 
Hardy challenges, she should appear through its repetition. The syntactical phrase repeats in 
the third line – “yes, as I knew you then” – making further time for the woman to appear by 
continually invoking her as a pronoun and the syntactical context in which she appears. 
 This experiment is inconclusive and the third stanza attempts a new experiment with 
the repeated syntactical pattern. “It” is exchanged for “you”; calling and hearing are 
exchanged for the meaningless sound of the “breeze.” This is an experiment in proving the 
converse, that the repeated syntactical phrase can represent missed-ness as much as presence, 
its recurrence conjuring only “listlessness” and “wan wistlessness.” The woman is 
emphatically absent, or, as the earlier draft put it, “consigned to existlessness.” The final line 
needlessly confirms the representational failure of syntax – “Heard no more again far or 
near.” 
 And so Hardy seems to have reached a cynical impasse that refuses to believe the 
pleasing lie that syntactical recurrence represents – if only by a one time configuration of 
form and sound – voice and, with it, presence. He does not deny that momentary 
representational inflections can occur as syntax moves through time. Indeed, the woman’s 
disappearance from the soundscape is not stated but hypothesised in a question. Hardy’s 
experiments, however, insist on a divergence between text and reading, a divergence of the 
kind described by Taylor and Griffiths. Syntax is not a straightforwardly mimetic feature of 
the text, always leading back to voice, returning textuality into sound; it maintains a 
stubbornly textual identity as a pattern of verbal organisation, a syntactical shaping of form. 
And the poem occurs out of this syntactical resistance, as Hardy works with and against the 
self-remembering, self-knowing returns of syntax to question the basis, substance, and reality 
of his own knowledge. 
 
 
 The final stanza turns the tables on this assumption that syntactical repetition only 
gains patterns of meaning when presented to the knowing human consciousness: 
    Thus I; faltering forward, 
Leaves about me falling, 
Wind oozing thin through the thorn from norward, 
And the woman calling. 
 
The anxious experiments with syntactical representation are exchanged for a hopeless and 
lonely perseverance, abandoning the magical thinking of the earlier stanzas and moving on in 
a new, leaner stanza-form. The wind – the sound of nothingness, emphatically not the 
woman’s voice – extends its long vowels into a long line, breaking with the shape of the 
repeated syntactical phrase and asserting the continuance of its own, unknowing sound. And 
yet, the “leaves around me falling” quietly re-sound the woman’s “call”, eventually falling 
into an unforeseen, unasked for evocation of “the woman calling.” The repeated syntactical 
phrase quietly recurs, remembering itself and calling up its initial association with voice.  
 
 Previously, syntax recurred unknowingly, unaware of the meaning of its returns. 
Remembering was a form of cognition only for the attentive poet or reader who, prompted by 
syntactical returns, continued the work of re-calling associated meaning. Now, however, 
syntax remembers its own associations after attention has lapsed, spontaneously evoking its 
original voice. This recalls Edison’s comment that the phonograph “knows more than we do 
ourselves” by virtue of the out-lasting perfection of its record. For Edison, time would reveal 
the phonograph’s superior knowledge as memories – eventually forgotten even by their 
authors – remained present to it in their original form. But “knowledge” is the wrong word 
for what the phonograph “knows”; the perfection of its recall is a present-tense phenomenon, 
its “knowledge” extracted from the linearity of time and always available to return. It is much 
more like the persisting gerund-form of knowing, of continual consciousness of what is and 
what has been. And this present self-recalling, self-knowing activity is also what becomes 
evident in Hardy’s syntax once the creative mind has ceased to interpolate meaning. Shelley 
eloquently describes this strange habit of apparently inanimate forms to reveal a lasting, 
unshakeable, and strangely present form of knowing long after their encounter with the mind 
and the mutual impression of cognition: 
 
The curse of this life is, that whatever is known can never be unknown. You inhabit a 
spot, which before you inhabit it, is as indifferent to you as any other spot on earth, 
and when, persuaded by some necessity, you think to leave it, you leave it not; it 
clings to you – and with memories of things, which, in your experience of them, gave 
no such promise, revenges your desertion.
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As long as the human mind is attentive to form – and to the poetic syntax through which it is 
formed – the knowledge it appears to represent seems the result of the interpretative action of 
the human mind. Creative participation in the structural returns of form and interpolation of 
the original association generates a pattern of conscious remembering co-authored by human 
 
 
mind and syntax. However, once the human mind becomes inattentive, the divergence 
between human knowledge and the knowing of the inanimate form becomes evident; the 
form continues to know unaided, remembering itself, calling up its own instantiations, and 
evoking its past meanings. 
 
Dennis Taylor’s comments on Hardy’s “metrical rhythms” are again instructive if 
they are allowed to describe the prosodic and syntactical phenomenon of the repeated 
syntactical phrase embedded in the patterns of poetic syntax:
9
 “the metrical rhythms which 
initially served as a conventional frame for the story becomes part of the story’s plot and 
reveals its culmination.”10 Taylor is describing the habit of the “metrical rhythm” – or, to 
fully characterise it, the syntactical phrase – to move from being a structural element, 
organising and carrying sense, to participating in and eventually controlling narrative 
progression. Poetic syntax shifts from being a knowledge-ordering structure to an actively 
knowing form. Thus, in “The Voice” the repeated syntactical phrase comes to intervene in the 
narrative, re-calling the woman’s voice despite the inattention of the poet. But how is 
“metrical rhythm” – or the patterning of poetic syntax – able to “know” in this way? Taylor 
describes these knowing forms as “obsolescing frames,” the dying reverberations of a “one 
time configuration of mind and reality.” Poetic syntax as a temporal phenomenon gives an 
ongoing but fading life to the associations generated by momentary coincidences of ordering 
principles and semantics. The signifying power of poetic syntax is therefore derivative from 
semantics; it does not inhere in its own organisational patterns. Their efficacy in prophesying 
the narrative outcome comes not from foreknowledge so much as an original insight into the 
basic dynamic of the narrative, the principles along which action will occur – its effect is 
revelatory rather than formative. At heart, Taylor’s understanding makes syntactical knowing 
an hallucination, a haunting of syntax by ghostly knowledge which has its true significance 
and origin in a prior historical and semantic moment.  
 
While Taylor’s “obsolescing frames” is beautiful in its plangent fatalism, it settles the 
nature of syntactical knowledge and knowing more than Hardy’s verse allows. Part of the 
fascination and beauty of Hardy’s verse is that it never goes on long enough to reveal whether 
syntactical ‘knowing’ is derivative (by becoming obsolete) or inherent (by continuing and 
inflecting). Both possibilities are kept in play: that poetic syntax is the shadow of knowledge, 
a fatalistic recurrence; and that it is ontologically independent, patterning reality and 
determining outcomes. Because its nature remains unsettled, Hardy is able to maintain a 
productive resistance between his own knowledge and the patterns of knowing present in 
poetic syntax. This resistance advances the question as to whether the “knowledge” offered 
by poetic syntax is a disembodied echo of one’s own knowledge, or whether it witnesses to 
an external consciousness, another form of knowing coming into dialogue with the creative 
mind. 
 
 Hardy’s “The Shadow on the Stone” (begun 1913: finished 1916) explores what kind 
of knowing – derivative, inherent, or something else – syntactical patterning might represent: 
 
      I went by the Druid stone 
 
 
   That broods in the garden white and lone, 
And I stopped and looked at the shifting shadows 
   That at some moments fall thereon 
   From the tree hard by with a rhythmic swing, 
   And they shaped in my imagining 
To the shade that a well-known head and shoulders 
   Threw there when she was gardening. 
 
      I thought her behind my back, 
   Yea, her I long had learned to lack, 
And I said: ‘I am sure you are standing behind me,  
   Though how do you get into this old track?’ 
   And there was no sound but the fall of a leaf 
   As a sad response; and to keep down grief 
I would not turn my head to discover 
   That there was nothing in my belief. 
 
      Yet I wanted to look and see 
   That nobody stood at the back of me, 
But I thought once more: ‘Nay, I’ll not unvision 
   A shape which, somehow, there may be.’ 
   So I went on softly from the glade, 
  And left her behind me throwing her shade, 
As she were indeed an apparition –  
   My head unturned lest my dream should fade.
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These “shifting shadows,” falling early in the poem, are the invitation to listen to Hardy’s 
syntax. The pairings of the earlier lines – “white and lone,” “stopped and looked” – measure 
and ponder the movement from one idea to the next, the transitions marked and delayed. The 
“shifting shadows” disrupt this singular and slow syntax, the “lone” speaker and stone 
overtaken by sudden numerousness, the parts of which are hidden within an obscuring plural. 
Simple, clearly delineated thought is put into sudden, rushed animation; once demarcated 
relations register only as grammatical traces within the compression. This grammatical and 
syntactical shift occurs as part of a larger instance of alteration within the poem’s structural 
patterning. The roughly iambic character of the opening lines and their prominently stressed 
monosyllables switch into syncopation. The long-vowelled rhymes of “stone” and “lone” are 
lost to the crammed syllables and close /sh/ sounds of the “shifting shadows.” The “shifting 
shadows” mark a stylistic shift within syntax as sentence-ordering and within the broader 
category of poetic syntax. The “shifting” of these shadows initiates a moment of coincidence 
between semantics and syntax. Intransitively shifting (if such a thing is possible) across the 
surface of the stone, they also register their own shifting of the syntactical structure. 
 
 This trick of using syntactical patterning to draw syntax and “shadows” under the 
“subject” of the poem (“shifting shadows”) makes syntax the origin and primary reference of 
 
 
the subject, turning our reading back to the origin and ordering of meaning, the knowing in 
syntax. Words and subject embedded within the poem’s structures occur as annotations of 
syntax. They have an independent and coherent existence yet are secondary to the syntactical 
structure, instantiations of it, only finding a larger connected context within it. Once again the 
primacy of syntax as the structure of knowledge is affirmed by its greater coherency. This 
trick occurs again in the following lines: 
 
And I stopped and looked at the shifting shadows 
   That at some moments fall thereon 
   From the tree hard by with a rhythmic swing. 
 
The syntax and lineation of the fourth and fifth lines produce an awkward twisting – “That at 
some moments fall thereon” stands as a coherent unit, completing sense and the requirements 
of rhyme, and describing the shadows’ movement upon the face of the stone. The fifth line, 
however, introduces a belated causality to the shadows’ movement. This does not change the 
sense of the fourth line but it does necessitate an awkward recalibration: attention 
momentarily shifts to the tree that suddenly looms close-at-hand and its previously unnoticed 
agency, only to find that attention is actually directed towards the shadows’ movement, from 
tree to stone. Reaching the “rhythmic swing,” it again has a double-meaning; it describes the 
movement of the shadows on the stone and the awkward syntactical parabola articulating the 
cause of this movement. Moreover, “rhythmic swing” picks up the disruptive sounds of 
“shifting shadows” (the /i/ vowel-sound and the internal /-ing/ rhyme) and repeats the 
moment of syncopation. The shadows’ identity within the poem (as a particular syntactical 
pattern) is once again embodied within a description of itself: the “rhythmic swing” is indeed 
a rhythmic swing. This consolidates the dual identity of the shadows as a poetic-syntactical 
phenomenon and as an envisioned occurrence.  
 
 From this point on, however, the “shadows” do not feature in the poem’s lexicon, 
only finding a belated and modified existence as the woman’s “shade.” Nevertheless, the 
shadows do recur as a repeated syntactical phrase: 
 
   And they shaped there in my imagining 
To the shade that a well-known head and shoulders 
   Threw there when she was gardening. 
 
These lines twice recall the moment of the shadows’ fall – as the tree’s shadows prompt a 
remembrance of the woman’s shadows, and then the original moment of the woman’s 
shadows falling on the ground. With each moment of recall, elliptically described without 
giving lexical form to the shadows, we hear their rhythmic swing – “imagining,” 
“gardening.” This is a description of how these shadows prompt the remembrance of another 
set of shadows occurring alongside an enactment of the shadows’ recurrent falling. The first 
occurs in the narrative in which the shadows are absent, while the latter occurs as a 
syntactical form, containing their rhythmic, metrical, and rhyming patterns. 
 
 
 
 From the moment of complete synonymity, syntactical pattern and semantics begin to 
diverge. The shadows’ rhythmic swing no longer quite coincides with the point at which they 
are verbally present. The rhythmic swing instead occurs at the end of the lines in which the 
shadows are implied, while the repetitions of the “rhythmic swing” as a recurrence of poetic 
syntax (“imagining,” “gardening”) no longer directly refer to the shadows, only the 
associated phenomena, even shifting away from the noun into new grammatical forms. The 
identity that occurred in the original “rhythmic swing” is unloosed. But the power of that 
moment continues to be felt – now patterned syntax alone signifies the shadows’ recurrent 
fall.  
 
 This patterning of syntax not only decoratively enacts the verbal narrative; it sustains 
the moment of “rhythmic swing,” its trace continually recalling the moment of the shadows’ 
fall which is the ground for the narrative meditation on its significance. This syntactical 
patterning does something that the words of the poem alone cannot do; namely, create and 
sustain a single moment of recurrence. Rhythmic patterning signifies a distinct and 
differently shaped narrative to the progression of articulated, linear sense. The importance of 
the interplay between syntax and the sense of the words it orders is evident in the poet’s 
conclusion: as long as the shadows fall on the ground, so long can he enjoy the imagined 
presence of the lost woman. This interplay suggests a new thought. It is not simply that the 
co-presence of different patterns of knowledge is a check and restraint to articulated, 
authorial knowledge, revealing its limitations, its hallucinations, its ultimate trajectory. 
Instead, the particular form authorial knowing takes is determined by the knowing of 
patterned syntax; it is the difference between the knowledge expressed through the 
progression of semantics and the knowing of recursion, that enables each pattern of 
knowledge to exist. The continual remembering of the falling shadows in syntax provides the 
origin and ongoing motive for the narrative’s linear reflection on the scene. It is in their 
difference that the particularities of each form of knowing are sustained. 
 
 But where does this other syntactical form of knowing originate from? Is the 
syntactical awareness the poet’s unconscious perception of the falling shadows, still present 
to the mind yet forgotten as it turns his thoughts to the woman? In this case, the recursions of 
syntax against the linear meditation cause the mind to discover the origins of its own 
thoughts, the knowing behind its knowledge. Or is this syntactical awareness truly another 
form of knowledge, the arbitrary association between falling shadows and a particular 
syntactical movement, giving substance to the unconscious returns of syntax’s self-recalling 
“mechanical memory”? This is truly a different form of knowledge, the same knowledge 
shared at the moment of association but then processed and remembered differently, known 
through different structures. 
 
 Hardy himself wonders about these co-present forms of knowing which bring the 
woman into being. “How did you get into this old track?” This “track” could be the garden 
path beside the Druid Stone at Max Gate, the woman physically present within the objective, 
external reality. Or “track” could be the familiar habit of thought, the woman present as a 
many-times recalled memory. This is the dilemma of whether syntactical knowing is 
 
 
derivative or inherent; whether it represents the reverberations of past knowledge or an 
ontologically distinct reality, an alternative form of knowledge and knowing. But this “track” 
could also be an allusion to the tracks or grooves of the phonograph. In this case the woman’s 
presence is neither in the mind nor in the garden but exists as inscription – really present but 
transposed into text, fully present but distilled into a form awaiting replay. 
 
 This sense of “track” as inscription is present in all three meanings. The garden 
“track” comes into being through repeated journeys, becoming the abstract marker of 
movement through the co-presence of its borders with the historical passages through it. 
Similarly, the mental “track” of habitual thought is the familiar shape of many rememberings, 
not a memory in itself but a record of distinctive and repeated occurrence in the mind. And 
the wax-tracings of the phonographic cylinder are not themselves sound but the edges of the 
hollow through which the running needle recalls the recording. This touches on the strange 
relationship between forms of knowing and forms of knowledge. For the place where 
knowing exists – where recorded instances are ever-present – is very different to the 
knowledge it expresses: the track is very different to the amble in the garden, the needle-
etchings are very different to Tennyson’s recital – the poet’s knowledge of the woman’s 
“presence” is very different to the syntactical form of knowing that facilitates it. Knowing 
stands as the negative shape of knowledge – the phonographic record to the voice, the plaster 
cast to the bronze – a means of reproduction that is very unlike the thing it reproduces. And 
yet, knowing and knowledge, syntax and semantics, cannot be separated.  
 
 Taylor recognised the significance of inscription in Hardy’s poetry: 
 
When Hardy sees his poems as recorded ‘impressions’, he is conscious of them as 
inscribed impressions, impressions of a world long gone. An impression is a one-time 
conjunction of mind and world; it is by nature ‘fugitive’, and can only be preserved in 
an inscription.
12
 
 
Inscription is what is left by transient impressions; textuality becomes a form of knowing that 
enables a return to – or of – that initial moment of knowledge. It is in attention to the 
particularities of the text that lost knowledge recurs. Griffiths nicely puts this dynamic 
between text and reading, knowing and knowledge: 
 
An achieved version of the transcriber’s plight, of this phantom understanding in the 
hollow of an ambiguity between the contexts of writing and speech dominates much 
of the greatest English poetry of the nineteenth century [...]
13
 
 
Griffiths suggests “understanding” lies in the divergence between text and reading, in the 
choices made and the choices not made as text becomes reading and voice. But Griffiths 
overlooks a further form of “phantom understanding”: the knowing that occurs textually, in 
the self-rememberings of poetic syntax. This textual understanding is an experience of 
knowing rather than knowledge, a gerund rather than a noun, a felt presence rather than a 
quantifiable reality.
14
 And in this sense Griffiths’ “phantom understanding” is apposite: just 
 
 
as the phonograph breeds ghosts out of its recorded voices, so textual inscription indicates the 
activity of understanding without translating it into a noun, into an “understanding” that can 
be imparted, separated from its form, and given away.
15
 
 
 Recently, interest has intensified in questions of cognitive poetics, of the kinds of 
knowledge and knowing that might be available in poetry. The self-rememberings of Hardy’s 
syntax, however, trouble a too-easy re-formulation of poetic “knowledge” as “an experience 
of knowing.”16 In Hardy we experience multiple forms of knowing: the knowing witnessed to 
by articulation, the knowing of the syntax that remembers its associations, the knowing that 
lies in the divergence of semantics and syntax, the knowing of textual inscription, and so on. 
And the status of these knowings is unsettled; is syntactical knowing ontologically distinct 
from or the reverberation of the poet’s knowledge, the patterns of his thought running 
through into form? Are there two forms of knowing or two knowings in one form? Hardy 
habitually leaves these questions undecided, continuing each poem for just long enough to 
reveal the clinging of knowledge to form, the persistence of memories in things, the habit of 
what is known to return suddenly and “revenge its desertion.” But these questions are not 
merely unsettled; they are also productive. The resistances and coincidences between the 
different forms of knowing develop a sustained and self-reflexive meditation on the quality 
and substance of the poet’s knowledge. Hardy’s uncertainty about what the poem might know 
amplifies Angela Leighton’s caution: “If we shall need ‘to ask what literary forms might 
know or know of’, this might also mean rewriting the terms of such knowledge, and being 
willing to listen to the strange things that are said.”17  
 
But shall we need to ask? To press the question too hard is to forget that poetry does 
not offer knowledge but forms of knowing. Hardy does ask how poetic form knows and what 
knowledge it might give but his question receives no answer: 
 
   [...] there was no sound but the fall of a leaf 
As a sad response; and to keep down grief 
   I would not turn my head to discover 
   That there was nothing in my belief. 
 
It seems unanswerable, the poem mute about its operations. But there is a response – of sorts. 
A “sad response.” How does the “leaf” answer? It falls in the same stanzaic position as the 
“rhythmic swing,” remembering the initial coincidence of semantics and syntax and the 
subsequent memory of semantics in syntax. The falling leaf recalls how syntactical self-
remembering once prompted other forms of memory, of returns to other forms of knowledge. 
And yet as the rhyme scheme falls into completion, Hardy refuses to return his attention to 
the falling shadows and “discover/ That there was nothing in my belief.” He seems to 
abandon the idea that syntax might be a real form of knowing. And yet – there is something 
in his belief. That returning, remembering “leaf” quietly falls once more, prolonging the hope 
that as long as poetic syntax is allowed to remember itself without the interpolative 
remembering of the poet or reader, so long will these delicate forms of knowing be sustained. 
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